

DRAFT APPROACH

Problem: Selecting from among manifold possibilities, those topics that should be covered by ORE as staff intelligence, This involves:

- a. Constant review of all intelligence, secret and public, and formulation of an integrated view of world events as they relate to US security.
- b. On the basis of this understanding, ability to perceive which events and situations require the type of analysis that constitutes staff intelligence as opposed to the repertorial function of current intelligence or the descriptive function of basic intelligence.
- c. Ability, so far as it is humanly possible, to perceive in advance what staff intelligence studies will be needed in order that as many as possible may be published well before the event.
- d. Performance of this function in coordination with the various departments within ORE, and with the IAC Agencies.

Importance: That the primary function of ORE is to produce analytical studies of the staff-intelligence type has been generally conceded. It

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has been noted, however, that (a) volume of staff intelligence was not great and has increased only slowly; (b) topics actually treated were often of glaringly less importance than others not treated; (c) studies were far too often begun after events had progressed so far that the study had to be rushed, was in consequence not thorough, and frequently was disseminated too late.

These shortcomings reflected, more than anything else, the haphazard way in which projects were initiated. In general, projects were suggested either by (a) the groups and branches; (b) the Staff Intelligence Group, or (c) an outside agency, generally the NSC.

In the case of (a) the project often developed when the routine work of an individual analyst suggested to him the possibility of a publishable study which study was accepted as a workable idea by the Branch Chief, and finally was offered to GS/I as a fait accompli. No endeavor had been made to weigh the value of the topic against the value of others within the competence of the Branch, or against related topics of superior importance which could be produced only in cooperation with another branch

or branches. The point was merely made that here was a paper in being, on a subject related to intelligence, which was therefore worthy of publication because it had been done. No effort had been made to determine if the time spent on the project was justified in terms of another use that might have been made of it.

In the case of (b), the reception accorded subjects suggested by G/SI, sometimes in cooperation with G/GS, frequently depended, not on the desirability of the project, but on such factors as alleged lack of personnel, amount of time spent on other matters -- with no attempt to weigh the desirability of such matters against the staff intelligence required -- or sheer disinclination to undertake such a project at the particular time. There was, in short, no stated method by which it could be determined, for any particular period, in terms of the total intelligence outlook and the total needs of the government, what items of staff intelligence must be treated, what items should be treated if possible, and what might be ignored or reported by other means.

In the case of (c) the matter was far simpler because if the

NBS called for intelligence on a certain topic by a certain date, it was produced and disseminated on that date. Even here, however, the cry was usually that the time limit was impossibly short, when, as a matter of fact, a systematized attempt to foresee intelligence requirements would have meant that the study required by NSC could have been already completed or at least in an advanced stage of preparation. It would seem to be mandatory, therefore, that a method be prescribed to insure adequate and timely staff intelligence coverage. Past experience indicates that the function of selecting staff intelligence topics must be centered in a single department of ORE which will have general supervision over the primary responsibility for the function. The Staff Intelligence Group is the logical department to undertake this responsibility. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

O/SI, therefore, shall:

- 1) Assume primary responsibility for the selection of topics to be treated in staff Intelligence studies over any given period
- 2) Make this selection on the basis of
 - a. Diligent study of all available intelligence and of the needs of policy-making bodies such as the NSC

b. Suggestions from all departments of ORE, particularly

G/GS and G/CU

g. Requests from other government agencies

3) In order to accomplish these objectives will, in collaboration with G/GS

a. Read as adequately as possible, periodicals and newspapers

having intelligence value; traffic received by G/CU; CIA

publications and those of the IAC agencies, and such other

material as may be appropriate; attend such lectures and

discussions as seem worth while

b. Check all available IAC Agency production schedules for

project suggestions and to detect unnecessary duplication

c. In so far as is feasible, keep in touch with work in progress

and contemplated in such organizations as the NSC and JCS.

4) Determine, under the authority of the ADR&E, what shall be

treated as staff intelligence as opposed to special evaluations,

other current reporting, or basic studies

- 5) In cooperation with Branch Chiefs, endeavor to assure that

available time and personnel in ORE be spent to the best

advantage with respect to staff intelligence to the extent

that
 - a. No time will be spent on studies that do not need to be

published
 - b. Priority studies will be given their due place ahead of

less urgent needs
- 6) Make every endeavor, in assigning work to ORE departments to

place the emphasis on developing situations, to the end that,

when publications are needed they will either have been com-

pleted or will be near enough to completion so that they may

be produced on time; will work in close cooperation with the

Branches in this endeavor.
- 7) In assigning or approving staff intelligence projects, will

take into account the extent to which particular sections of

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ORE are equipped to undertake them, but will also, on the basis of such observation, advise the Assistant Director as to measures needed to strengthen ORE weaknesses with respect to staff intelligence.

- 8) Prepare appropriate production schedules with approximate dates of completion, for the information of CIA and such other organizations as need it.